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Stanovich and West's dual-system proposals represent a major development in an 
understanding of reasoning and rationality. We feel, however, that they their notion of 
System-1 functioning as a computational escape hatch during the processing of 
complex tasks may deserve a more central role in explanations of reasoning 
performance. We describe examples of apparent escape-hatch processing from the 
reasoning and judgement literature. 
 
 
Stanovich and West (S&W) present impressive support for their proposal that 
patterns of individual differences in performance can advance an understanding of 
reasoning, rationality and the normative/descriptive gap. We find their evidence and 
arguments compelling, and likewise believe that dual-system accounts are central to 
clarifying the nature and limits of human rationality. Many of S&W's proposals 
surrounding the goals, constraints and operations of System 1 (contextualised, 
interactional intelligence) and System 2 (decontextualised, analytic intelligence) strike 
us as significant conceptual advances over previous dual-process accounts (Epstein, 
1994; Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996), which, because of elements of under-
specification, have often raised as many questions as they have answered. Other 
strengths of S&W's account derive from their recognition of the importance of 
intentional-level constructs (e.g., metacognition and thinking styles) in controlling 
cognition.  
 
Still, certain claims about how a dual-system distinction can explain performance 
dichotomies between individuals of differing analytic intelligence seem worthy of 
critical analysis. One claim that forms our focus here is that "sometimes alternative 
construals [arising from System 1] might be computational escape hatches….That is, 
an alternative construal might be hiding an inability to compute the normative model" 
(S&W, footnote 7). As an example S&W note that some people may process abstract 
selection tasks as inductive problems of optimal data sampling (Oaksford and 
Chater, 1994) because of difficulties in computing deductive responses via System 2. 
This computational-escape-hatch concept is appealing; we have alluded to a similar 
notion (Ball, Sutherland & Quayle, 1997, p. 60) when considering the processing 
demands (e.g., relating to the requirement for meta-inference) of abstract selection 
tasks. We wonder, however, whether the computational-escape-hatch idea should 
feature more centrally in S&W's dual-system account such that it may generalise 
findings across a range of difficult tasks. 
 
To explore this possibility it is necessary to examine S&W's proposals regarding the 
application of analytic abilities to override System-1 task construals. They state that 
"for some individuals, System 2 processes operating in parallel….will have the 
requisite computational power….to override the response primed by System 1" (p.31-
-Section 6.1, para.5), and further note that this override function "might only be 
needed in a tiny minority of information processing situations (in most cases, the two 
Systems will interact in concert)" (p.34--Section 6.3, para.2). What we find revealing 
here is the suggestion that all individuals will at least attempt to apply System-2 
processes to achieve some form of decontextualised task construal--albeit perhaps a 
fragmentary one. Having put the effort into System-2 computation it is hard to 
imagine why any individual (even ones low in analytic intelligence) should then ignore 
the System-2 output, unless, perhaps, they lack confidence about the efficacy of their 
System-2 computations (i.e., they have metacognitive awareness of having 
experienced computational difficulties). Indeed considerable evidence exists that 
people do produce normatively-optimal responses to computationally-tractable 
deductive-reasoning problems (e.g., certain 'one-model' syllogisms) and that 
common non-normative responses to harder problems reflect possible (but not 
necessary) inferences from attempts at applying a deductive procedure (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Perhaps, then, tasks at the easy-to-intermediate end 
of the complexity continuum do invoke System-2 responses for most individuals, 
whereas tasks at the intermediate-to-hard end differentially favour a System-2 
response from those of higher analytic intelligence, and a last-resort System-1 
response from those of lower analytic intelligence (because they induce high levels of 
metacognitive uncertainty about System-2 efficacy). 
 
One upshot of this argument is that recourse to System-1 computational escape 
hatches may, for any individual, vary from problem to problem depending on 
processing demands and levels of metacognitive uncertainty about System-2 
functioning. Thus, whilst performance on non-deontic selection tasks may, for the 
majority, reflect either a fall-back System-1 response or a failed attempt at System-2 
processing, performance on deontic versions may be within nearly everyone's 
System-2 capabilities. Indeed, Johnson-Laird (1995) presents an essentially System-
2 account of why deontic selections tasks (and non-deontic ones where counter-
examples can be invoked) may be easy to compute normative responses for. If 
deontic selection tasks reflect manageable System-2 processing, then this obviates 
any need to posit System 1 task construals (e.g., based around pragmatic schemas 
or Darwinian algorithms). 
 
Another upshot of our argument about task difficulty. metacognitive uncertainty and 
fall-back mechanisms is the possibility that an escape-hatch response may actually 
be the default strategy for any individual whose motivated attempt at a System-2 
construal is overloaded. As such, computational escape hatches may underlie more 
responding than S&W seem willing to concede. One example from the judgement 
literature is Pelham, Sumarta and Myaskovsky's (1994) proposal that people fall back 
on a 'numerosity = quantity' heuristic when judging amount (e.g., of food) under 
conditions of task complexity. Another example comes from our own account on 
belief-bias effects in the evaluation of syllogistic conclusions (Quayle & Ball, in press) 
which assumes that participants: (i) fulfil instructions to suspend disbelief and accept 
the truth of implausible premises (i.e., by overriding initial System-1 processing); (ii) 
attempt the (System-2) application of a mental-models based reasoning strategy; and 
(iii) produce belief-biased responses (i.e., use System 1 as an escape hatch) when 
working-memory constraints lead to threshold levels of metacognitive uncertainty 
being surpassed in relation to the perceived efficacy of (System-2) reasoning. The 
latter, we argue, is more likely to happen on invalid than valid syllogisms since invalid 
syllogisms are difficult (see Hardman & Payne, 1995; Ball & Quayle, 1999, for 
supporting evidence), so explaining the standard interaction between belief and logic 
on conclusion acceptances. This escape-hatch account predicts that participants will 
be more confident with responses to valid than invalid problems, and more belief-
biased with invalid problems when they have lower working-memory capacities than 
fellow reasoners. Our data support both predictions (Quayle & Ball, in press) and are 
difficult to reconcile with theories positing selective scrutiny of unbelievable 
conclusions (e.g., Evans, Over & Manktelow, 1993). 
 
In conclusion, although we believe that S&W's proposals are a milestone in the 
development of an understanding of reasoning and rationality, we feel they may have 
downplayed the role of System 1 functioning as a computational escape hatch 
(whether triggered by algorithmic-level limitations or intentional-level factors). To test 
predictions of escape-hatch accounts of reasoning would seem a fruitful avenue for 
investigation using process-tracing methods, including protocol analysis, eye tracking 
and on-line confidence assessment. Such techniques should help clarify aspects of 
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